Обзор систем торговых преференций для беднейших стран
Аннотация
Проанализировано оказание помощи беднейшим странам с целью повышения эффективности их торговых операций, осуществляемых на семи приоритетных рынках (Канады, Китая, Европейского Союза, Индии, Японии, Южной Кореи и США — посредством предоставления им преференциального режима доступа на указанные рынки).
Данная проблема рассмотрена не только в страновом аспекте, но и с точки зрения охвата производимой продукции, ограничений по отдельным программам преференций, оценки стоимости программ помощи, включая потенциал для внесения улучшений, и потенциальных последствий от завершения Доха-раунда ВТО.
Сформулированы некоторые предложения по программам помощи, чтобы они способствовали большему вкладу в сферу торговли НРС, в ускорение их экономического развития.
Скачивания
Литература
Agra Europe EBA treaty will force further CAP reforms. 2001. 9 Mar. P. 1–3.
Alexandraki K., Lankes H.-P. The Impact of Preference Erosion on Middle- Income Developing Countries // IMF Working Paper. 2004. WP/04/169.
Berisha-Krasniqi V., Boue’t A., Laborde D., Mevel S. The Development Promise: Can the Doha Development Agenda Deliver for Least Developed Countries? Briefing Note. 2008. Wash.: IFPRI, 2008.
Bora B., Cernat L., Turrini A. Duty Free and Quota Free Market Access for LDCs: Further Evidence from CGE Modeling. UNCTAD Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study. 2002. No. 14.
Brenton P. Integrating the Least Developed into the world trading system: The current impact of EU preferences under Everything but Arms // World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper. 2003. No. 3018.
Boue’t A., Laborde D., Mevel S. What Can Least Developed Countries Really Expect from the Doha Development Agenda? 2008. URL: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162941>.
Carrere C. The Doha Round and Market Access for LDCs — Scenarios for the EU and US Markets. Etudes et document E 2009. No. 11, CERDI, Clermont Ferrand.
Cernat L., Laird S., Monge-Roffarello L. The EU’s Everything But Arms Initiative and the Least-developed Countries // Discussion Paper No. 2004/47 of UNU-WIDER.
Elliott K.A. Open Markets for the Poorest Countries — Trade Preferences That Work. Wash.: Center for Global Development, 2010.
European Commission. EU Trade Concessions to Least Developed Countries — Everything But Arms Proposal: First Remarks on the Possible Impacts on the Agricultural Sector // Report by the European Commission Directorate for Agriculture. 2000. URL: <http://europa.eu,int/comm/commissioners/fishler/ebaen.pdf>.
European Commission. Trade as a driver of development // Staff Working Document. Brussels, 27 January 2012.
Hoekman B., Martin W., Primo Braga C.A. (eds). Quantifying the Value of Preferences and Potential Erosion Losses. Wash.: World Bank, 2008.
Hoekman B., Martin W., Primo Braga C.A. (eds). Preference Erosion: Mea- surement and Policy Response. Wash.: World Bank, 2009.
Ianchovichina E., Mattoo A., Olarreaga M. Unrestricted Market Access for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Much is it Worth and Who Pays? // CEPR Discussion Paper. 2000. No. 2820.
Kravis I. B. Trade as a handmaiden of growth: Similarities between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries // Economic Journal. 1970. Vol. 80. P. 850–872.
Laborde D. Looking for a Meaningful Duty Free Quota Free Market Access Initiative in the Doha Development Agenda // ICTSD Issue Paper. 2008. No. 4. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva.
Laird S., Yeats A. Quantitative Methods for Trade Barrier Analysis // NYUP. 1990.
Laird S., Fernandez de Cordoba S. (eds). Coping with Trade Reforms. L.: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.
Low P., Permartini R., Richtering J. Multilateral solutions to the Erosion of non-reciprocal preferences in NAMA, in Hoekman et al. (2009a).
Low P., Permartini R., J. Richtering. Non-reciprocal preference erosion arising from MFN liberalisation in agriculture: what are the risks? // Hoekman B., Martin W., Primo Braga C.A. (eds). Preference Erosion: Measurement and Policy Response. Wash.: World Bank, 2009.
Van der Mensbrugghe D. The Doha Development Agenda and Preference Erosion: Modeling the Impacts // Hoekman B., Martin W., Primo Braga
C.A. (eds) // Preference Erosion: Measurement and Policy Response. Wash.: World Bank, 2009.
Nurske R. Balanced and unbalanced growth. Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy / R. Nurske, G. Haberler, R.M. Stern (eds) // Harvard Economic Studies. 1961. Vol. 118. P. 241–278.
Page S., Hewitt A. The New European Trade Preferences: Does the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) Help the Poor? // Development Policy Review. 2002. Vol. 20. No. 1. P. 91–102.
Portugal-Perez A. The Costs of Rules of Origin in Apparel: African Preferential Exports to the United States and the European Union // Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series. 2008. No. 39.
Rodriguez F., Rodrik D. Trade policy and economic growth: A skeptic’s guide to the cross-national evidence // NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000 /
B. Bernanke, K. Rogoff (eds). Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.
Sachs J., Warner W. Globalization and economic reform in developing countries // Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1995. No. 1.
Taslim M. A. Dispute Settlement in the WTO and the Least Developed Countries: the case of India’s anti-dumping duties on lead battery imports from Bangladesh // Geneva, ICTSD. Prepared for a conference in Jakarta on 25–26 January 2006.
Trueblood M., Somwaru A. Trade Liberalization and the Least Developed Countries: Modeling the EU’s Everything but Arms Initiative // Paper presented at the 2002. Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Taipei.
UNCTAD. Duty and Quota Free Market Access for LDCs: An Analysis of Quad Initiatives. L.; Geneva, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001a.
UNCTAD. Improving Market Access for Least Developed Countries. UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/4. Geneva, 2001b.
UNCTAD. Handbook on the Scheme of the European Community. UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc. 25/Rev. 2. Geneva, 2002.
UNCTAD. The Least Developed Countries Report 2010 — Towards a New International Architecture for LDCs. United Nations. Sales No. E. 10. II. D. 5. N.-Y.; Geneva, 2010a.
UNCTAD. UNCTAD’s Appraisal of the Implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action for LDCs for the Decade 2001–2010, document no. UNCTAD/ALDC, 2009/2, United Nations. Geneva; N.-Y., 2010b.
Vyborny K. What could the Doha Round mean for Africa? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Wash.: DC, 2007. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/vybornywc1.pdf>.
WTO. Preferential tariff treatment for Least-developed Countries, Notification from Korea. WTO document WT/COMTD/N/12/Rev.1. 28 April. 2000.
WTO. The Generalised System of Preferences: A preliminary analysis of the GSP schemes in the Quad. Note by the Secretariat. WTO document WT/ COMTD/W/93. 5 October. 2001.
WTO. China’s Duty-Free Quota-Free programme for LDC products, Communication from China, Revision. WTO document G/C/W/656/Rev.1, WT/COMTD/N/39/Add.1/Rev.1. 1 December. 2001a.
WTO. Notification of preferential tariff treatment for LDCs (as per paragraph 2 of WT/L/304 AND WT/L/759) and transparency mechanism for preferential trade arrangements (as per WT/L/806 and WT/COMTD/73). WTO document G/C/W/651, WT/COMTD/N/38. 12 September. 2011b. (This is the notification by India.)
WTO. Market access for products and services of export interest to Least-developed Countries, Note by the Secretariat. WTO document WT/ COMTD/LDC/W/48/Rev.1. 9 March. 2011c.
WTO. Market access for products and services of export interest to Least-developed Countries, Note by the Secretariat. WTO document WT/ COMTD/LDC/W/51/Rev.1. 10 October. 2011c.
WTO. Market access for products and services of export interest to Least- Developed Countries, Note by the Secretariat. WTO document WT/ COMTD/LDC/W/56. 1 October. 2012.
Wusheng Yu, Jensen V.N. Tariff Preferences, WTO Negotiations and the LDCs: the Case of the ‘Everything But Arms’ Initiative // The World Economy. Wiley Blackwell, 2005. Vol. 28 (3). P. 375–405.
